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   QUANTITY PREMIUM 
IN REAL PROPERTY MARKETS
    by 
Takatoshi Tabuchi 
 October 1993
                      ABSTRACT 
     Using land market data in residential districts of Osaka Metropolitan Area in 1993, 
we tested the theory of nonlinear pricing. It was shown that quantity premiums prevail in 
real property markets, i.e., higher unit land prices for greater consumption of land is 
observed unlike in many commodity markets. We demonstrated that this is due to the 
irreversibility in changing lot size, the oligopolistic market structure, nondecreasing marginal utility, and/r nondecreasing tur s to scale in production. 
JEL codes: C21, L13, R21
1. Introduction 
     In many cities, some districts are planned with wide and straight roads whereas 
other districts are planlessly developed with narrow and twisted roads. The population 
density in the former is usually lower than that in the latter. Which districts are more 
desirable for society? From an aesthetic point of view, there is no doubt that the former 
districts are more desirable than the latter. For society as a whole, wide roads and large 
lot size in planned districts are desirable in that they ensure good exterior environments, 
relieve traffic congestion, and so on. That is why the necessity of city planning such as 
land use regulations and land readjustment projects is widely recognized. 
     However, city planning does not always meet the interests of landowners ince 
having wide roads implies a reduction in their lot size. In general, given a total area, 
landowners prefer a larger area of lots and a smaller area of roads, usually leading to a 
decline in the overall environmental value. This is so-called the negative externalities 
generated by self-interested behavior of individual andowners. 
     While each lot size is great in the case of no planning regulations, the land price per 
unit area must be low as compared to planned one because of the difference in open space 
of roads. And so, it is ambiguous if the aggregate value of land is higher in planned 
districts than that in unplanned districts. Suppose that the benefits of environmental 
characteristics are fully capitalized by the land price as is often assumed in the literature of 
hedonic theory. Suppose further that the costs of land improvements and road 
construction are constant. Then, a social welfare would be measured by the aggregate land 
price of the whole district. For example, if the aggregate land price in a planlessly 
developed istrict is higher, then we may say that unplanned istricts are more desirable 
and that an efficient allocation of land can be achieved by market mechanism without city 
planning by public authorities. 
     If we had detailed data on land price and lot size of each lot, we could calculate the 
aggregate land value in each district, enabling us to answer the question raised above. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of such fine data, we cannot give a direct answer, but in this 




     The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we state a developer's 
problem of determining lot sizes. In Section 3, we conduct an empirical analysis to get an 
answer for it by using land price data in Osaka Metropolitan Area. In Section 4, we 
discuss on the results obtained in our analysis of the land market as well as in the literature 
on condominium markets. In Section 5, we make an attempt to explain the results using 
theories of nonlinear pricing in a differentiated product market. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Optimization of lot sizes by a developer 
     To simplify the argument posed in the previous section, consider a situation that all 
the lots in a district is owned by a single developer. In selling lots, he would subdivide or 
assemble them such that the aggregate value of the lots is maximized. In conventional 
theory of urban economics a la Alonso (1964), the optimal ot size in each location is 
determined mainly by the distance from the central business district (CBD) if there is no 
indivisibility problem and institutional constraints. And so, the lot size would exhibit 
geographical regularities: a monotonic ncrease in the (time) distance from the CBD; and 
no mixture of different lot sizes at the same distance from the CBD. 
     However, things are not so simple in the real world especially in cities having long 
history. In Japanese cities, for example, the lot size distribution, which is a reciprocal of 
the household density distribution is never monotonic geographically. It varies even within 
a small area according to local conditions. It is commonly observed in Japanese large cities 
that high rise apartment houses are located next to detached houses. Such a housing 
mixture is a result of historically cumulative development processes under myopic foresight 
by developers and landowners with housing durability (Harrison and Kain, 1974). Given 
uncertain factors in the future land markets, perfect foresight behavior is not always 
possible, which has resulted in uneven sizes, of land lots. 
     Admittedly, the historical cities are quite different from the cities envisioned in 
urban economic theory. It is, however, short-circuited that the difference between reality 
and theory is simply ascribed to the myopic foresight behavior of developers and 
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landowners together with the durability of buildings. Although developers do not perfectly 
foresee the future, they are not so totally myopic insofar as the amount of land is scarce 
and the price of land is very high. There must exist other factors determining the lot size, 
which we seek in the subsequent analysis of this paper. 
     In deciding the optimal lot size, the profit-maximizing developer would carefully 
observe the market demand for land: 
                            p=.(s, x), (1) 
where p is the price of lot i per unit area, s is the lot size, and x is a vector of other 
attributes such as access to the CBD, amenity, local environments, and so forth. Provided 
that the specification f (1) is correct, he developer can measure the marginal effect of lot 
size on the price of unit land (8p/8s), controlling the set of locational ttributes x.
     That is, if ap/as is positive, the price of unit land is larger for a larger lot in the 
land market, which is called quantity premiums. In this case, the developer would attempt 
to maximize the lot size, and never subdivide any lot. He would assemble contiguous lots 
as many as possible. If ap/as is negative, on the other hand, the unit price decreases with 
lot size, which is called quantity discounts. The developer would subdivide the lots until 
they reach the minimum lot size. 
     In either case, ignoring the indivisibility problem, the currently existing lot size 
must be a maximizer ofunit and total land price (Asami, 1993): [i] each lot size should be 
maximized when the price of unit land is increasing (ap/as>O); and [ii] each lot size should 
be minimized when the price of unit land is decreasing in the lot size (ap/as<0). An 
empirical test on the sign of ap/8s is conducted in the next section. 
3. Empirical analysis of the land market 
     Based upon the foregoing, let us conduct an empirical analysis of equation (1) in 
order to test whether quantity discounts or quantity premiums prevail in the land market. 
Since the lot size s is considered to be a quantity variable in land markets, we pay 
attention especially to the impact of the lot size on the unit land price p. 
     After some trial and error, we decided to specify the function f as the following 
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isemi logarithm form: 
K 
                 log pi = ao + alsi + k = 2akXki + ei for i=1,..,I, (2) 
where ak (k=0,...,K) are parameters to be estimated statistically, K is the number of 
independent variables, xk's are the independent variables, e is the residual, I is the number 
of observations, and subscript i is added to each variable for the sake of statistical analysis. 
Since Op/8s=alp, we test statistical significance on the sign of a1, and conclude in the 
following way: 
          if a1<0, quantity discounts prevail in the land market; 
          if a1>0, quantity premiums prevail in the land market.
    We used koji chika (officially posted land prices) for the land prices p [in thousand 
yen per m2] in residential districts of Osaka Metropolitan Area in 1993 (Japan Land 
Agency, 1993). It also contains the site-specific data such as the lot size s [in m2] and the 
distance from the lot to the nearest railroad station x2 [in m]. Data on the total minutes 
from the nearest station to the CBD of Osaka X3 [in minutes] are calculated by the minutes 
needed by using the fastest commuter t ains with train changing (if any) time of five 
minutes. 
     These data are collected along six commuter railroads starting from the CBD of 
Osaka: Keihan Line, JR Katamachi Line, JR Hanwa Line, Nankai Line, Kintetsu Osaka 
Line and Kintetsu Nara Line. Summary statistics are given in Table 1. We know from the 
statistics that each variable is within a certain range since each standard deviation is not so 
large, and that the average value of land prices is much higher and the average lot size is 
much smaller than an international level. Put it differently, Osaka Metropolitan Area is 
densely inhabited, and its land market is of paramount importance. Since the first two 
lines are running close and parallel with each other, we ran a regression together using a 
dummy variable. The same is true for the second two lines and the last two lines. We also 
ran a regression using all six lines using five dummy variables. 
     The result is summarized in Table 2.1 Generally speaking, we got a good fit: the 
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values of the regression coefficients in the first three cases are similar, and the t statistics of 
all coefficients are large. Most of the regression coefficients are significant at the 1% level, 
and the values of R2 (between log p and its estimate, and between p and its estimate) are 
sufficiently arge. This would justify not only our specification f equation (2), but also our 
choice of the six lines. In other words, we may say that (the logarithm of) the land price 
along these lines can be explained only by the few variables: the access to the CBD and the 
lot size. 
     Observing the sign of al (the first row in Table 2), we do recognize that it is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level (Keihan-Katamachi Lines, Kintetsu 
Osaka-Nara Lines, and all six Lines) or at the 5% level(Hanwa-Nankai Lines). These 
results do support the quantity premium hypothesis in the land market.2 This exhibits a 
clear contrast to various markets of consumption goods, where quantity discounts are 
common practices: apples are often sold like one for 100 yen and three for 200 yen. We 
discuss the reasons for the opposite conclusion in the following sections. 
     Before the discussion, we should mention two points to notice. The first point is an 
econometric problem of multicolinearity between the independent variables in equation (2). 
According to the theory of urban economics, both the land price p and the lot size s are 
determined mainly by the distance from the CBD.3 If this were to be true, s would be 
correlated with the distance to the station x2 and/or the time (distance) to the CBD x3, 
which would invalidate our specification, and hence our analysis itself. 
     So as to check this problem, we computed the correlation coefficients between the 
lot size s and the total time from the lot to the CBD (a2/ a3)x2+x3, using the estimates of
a2 and a3 in Table 2. The value of respective correlation coefficients are: 0.237 in 
Keihan-Katamachi Lines, 0.167 in Hanwa-Nankai Lines, and 0.093 in Kintetsu 
Osaka-Nara Lines. The corresponding t statistics to each correlation coefficient are: 2.56, 
2.17, and 1.19 respectively. The first two values are statistically significant at the 5% 
level, but not at the 1% level whereas the last one is not significant at the 5% level. We 
thus confirm that the above multicolinearity problem hardly arises in our data set. 
     The insignificant correlations imply that given a distance from the CBD , large lots 
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iand small lots are mixed in Osaka Metropolitan Area. This is in accord with casual 
observations in Japanese cities where wealthy households are located near the poor in many 
districts. To sum up, whereas the land price is decreasing in the access to the CBD, the lot 
size distribution (and hence, population density) does not exhibit such an empirical 
regularity in Osaka Metropolitan Area. 
     The second point is on the difference in land market constraints. According to the 
literature, quantity discounts (8p/8s<0) are observed in several American cities: the 
township of Ramapo (White, 1988), Champaign-Urbana (Colwell and Scheu, 1989), and 
nine cities (Holway and Burby, 1990). The opposite results to ours may be ascribed to 
several factors such as differences in population sizes, area sizes, city locations, and 
development histories. In particular, the average unit land price in Osaka Metropolitan 
Area is about 300 times as high as that in Ramapo while the average lot size in Ramapo is 
about 40 times as large as that in Osaka Metropolitan Area. 
     These comparisons would indicate that Osaka Metropolitan Area (as well as many 
big metropolitan areas in Japan) is so overpopulated that vacant land is scarcely left, 
implying that land assembly isa binding constraint. On the other hand, in Ramapo (and 
other American small cities), land is not so scarce, but there are other binding constraints 
such as large lot zoning, which restricts subdivision of land. Consequently, the land 
markets between Japan and the United States are not directly comparable. What we are 
dealing with in this paper is the scarce good. 
4. Irreversibility in real property 
     Let us consider the economic implications of the above results in the land market 
contrasting with observations in commodity markets. Spence (1977) rightly states the 
following. "Quantity discounts tend to be undone by resale, where resale is possible. 
Quantity premiums are undone by repeat purchasing, where that activity is feasible and 
not too costly." In most of commodity markets, purchasing a commodity in large 
quantities and resaling it into multiple consumers is not easy since consumers need to 
coordinate. It is rather easy to purchase a commodity in small quantities repeatedly by the 
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same consumer. It follows from these that quantity discounts are enforceable, but quantity 
premiums are not in many commodity markets. 
     In the land market, however, we have empirically shown that the reverse (quantity 
premium) is true. Unlike ordinary commodities, repeat purchase of contiguous lots is 
prohibitively difficult whereas resale by subdividing a large lot is easy in the land market 
because it is only due to the landowner's decision. Nonetheless, no lot will not be 
subdivided since the price of unit land is positively associated with lot size (8p/8s>0). On 
the other hand, landowners have an incentive to assemble their lots if possible because the 
unit land price becomes greater. Such intermediary business of land assembly is sometimes 
conducted by developers especially when land for office building is highly demanded in the 
business districts. 
     It is, however, rarely done in residential districts partly because benefits of a land 
price increase in residential districts are not so large as compared with those in business 
districts, and partly because in assembling lots developers have to mediate real property 
rights between landowners. For example, if one of the landowners is simply uninterested in 
an increase in the value of his real properties, then land assembly itself is not put into 
practice. Or, if a landowner may contrive to maximize his return by not selling his lot 
until all the other landowners bargain away their lots to a developer (Eckart, 1985). Then, 
the landowner can exploit he developer's super-normal profit from the project because in 
the negotiation he can gain an advantage over the developer who has already invested to 
purchase lots in the vicinity. Existence of such sunk costs in transaction is favorable to the 
landowner while unfavorable to the developer resulting in the impediment in land 
assembly. 
     We can therefore say that lot size is characterized by irreversibility: once it is 
subdivided and sold to different people, it is very difficult o be assembled asit was before 
because of the transaction costs. That is why quantity premiums are enforceable, but 
quantity discounts are not.in the land market.
Let us next investigate the asset pricing of an apartment in a condominium. Here, 
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ithe floor area of an apartment is used as a proxy for the lot size s, which is the quantity 
variable. Several empirical analyses in resent years demonstrate that there is a similarity 
between the apartment markets and the land markets. According to the analyses of 
condominium arkets by Kato (1988), Arima (1992) and Nakamura (1992), quantity 
premiums prevail also in the apartment markets. 
     In building a condominium, a developer determines the floor area of each apartment 
so that the total asset price of the condominium is maximized. Since it is newly built, the 
developer freely determines the floor area of each apartment unit and its price without 
caring for any socio-political reasons inherent in the land markets mentioned above. Note, 
however, that once it is constructed, both assembly and subdivision of apartments are 
almost impossible. Unlike the land market, the irreversibility takes place in both 
directions in the apartment market. This implies that both quantity discounts and 
quantity premiums are enforceable as tools for nonlinear pricing in the apartment markets. 
     It is worth noting that the pricing of apartments is by no means cost based as in 
ordinary commodities. If it were on a cost basis, then under increasing returns to scale in 
apartment construction the unit floor price would become higher for smaller apartment 
houses, which means quantity discounts. In reality, however, we have seen that quantity 
premiums are prevailing in those markets. 
5. Theories of nonlinear pricing in a differentiated market 
     The developer's problem in Section 2 may be analyzed by the theory of nonlinear 
pricing developed by Spence (1977) and Mussa and Rosen (1978), where a monopolist offers 
differentiated products with a price-quality schedule exercising price discrimination via 
quantity discounts/premiums. Extending their analysis further, Maskin and Riley (1984) 
rigorously showed that quantity discounts are the optimal strategy in a monopolized 
market. 
    Following Tirole (1988), let us describe the nonlinear pricing model briefly. 
Consumers are heterogeneous in taste 0. A monopolist (developer) cannot observe 0, but 
knows its distribution, which is uniformly distributed over a nonnegative interval [01i02]. A 
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consumer 0, purchasing a good (lot) with quantity (lot size) s and an outside numeraire 
good z, has an additively separable utility function given by4 
                       U(s,z, 0) = z + Ou(s), (3) 
where u'O and u"<O due to a decreasing marginal utility of s. The consumer's budget 
constraint is 
                        y= z+ P(s), (4) 
where y is the income, and P(s)[=p(s)s] is the price of s. The first-order condition using 
(3) and (4) is 
                       P'(s) = Ou'(s). (5) 
     The profit-maximizing monopolist offers a price-quantity schedule, which is 
derived from 
                         02 
                 maximize ize it = 
6 [P(s(O))-cs(O)]dO, 
1 where c is the marginal cost of production. Solving this, we obtain 
                        c = u'(s)(20 - 02). (6) 
Substituting 0 in (6) into (5) and differentiating yields 
                      P"(s) = 02u"(s)/2 < 0. 
We know from this and (5) that the monopolist's price schedule is increasing in quantity 
but at a decreasing rate, and hence the unit price is decreasing, implying the quantity 
discounts. This may be intuitively understood by the fact that the larger quantity is 
valued less owing to the assumption of decreasing marginal utility. 
     Alternatively, we may say that quantity discounts are a direct result of the 
first-degree or second-degree price discrimination. Under any downward demand 
function, the unit price is a decreasing function of quantity sold, which is equivalent to 
quantity discounts. Furthermore, economies of scale in retail and production technology is 
another conceivable reason for quantity discounts since we expect that lower costs of 
distribution and production are associated with a lower unit price. 





empirical results in the real property markets, where quantity premiums are shown to 
exist. We should examine the model assumptions made by Maskin and Riley (1984) to see 
if some of them are against the actual situations in the real property markets. 
     Amongst the assumptions, it seems inappropriate to assume a decreasing marginal 
utility in space consumption in densely inhabited istricts as in Japanese big cities. If u(s) 
in (3) is increasing in s with an increasing rate, then the price-quantity schedule would 
become convex representing quantity premiums. Another inadequate assumption made 
above may be the monopolistic setting in the real property markets. Indeed, developers are 
usually local monopolists competing with their neighboring firms, and their property is not 
perfectly protected from an influence of other real property nearby. Real property is 
differentiated quantitatively in that different sizes mean different goods when a change in 
their sizes is prohibitively costly. (In a quality interpretation, different locations mean 
different goods due to environmental differences.) The differentiation is not horizontal, but 
vertical because real property with larger in size or better in location is more evaluated 
unanimously. 
     On the basis of these considerations, let us allow free entry of firms so that the 
market structure be oligopolistic in lieu of monopolistic, and relax the assumption of 
decreasing marginal utility. Following Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, subsection 
8.3.2), we would like to reformulate he above model. Now, the relative value of 02/ 01 is 
given such that J firms (developers) are 'viable' in the market. consumers self-select 
among oods j (j=1,...,J). The utility function and the budget constraint are as (3) and 
(4) respectively except with subscript j added to s and P. 
     Firms play a noncooperative three-stage game. In the first stage, firms make an 
entry decision. In the second, they choose quantity sj, and finally, they select price P;. It 
should be noted that whereas the monopolist offers a price-quantity schedule in the above 
model, each oligopolist chooses a single quantity with a single price here.5 Without loss of 
A generality, let sj<sj+1 for all j=1,..,J-1. The market boundary 0 is then determined by the 
condition that a consumer 8j is indifferent between sj and s, +1. Namely, 
A 
               y-Pj + 9iu(se) = y-Pj+1+ eiu(si+1) or 
                           10
                           8• = P'+1 +1-Pi            U( 
s~+1 -use 
     Note that sj#sj+1 for all j=1,..,J-1 since firms avoid the Bertrand price competition 
yielding zero profit. Utilizing this expression, let us solve the third-stage game first. Each 
profit maximizing firm optimizes its price as 
                   maximize lrj = (Pi - csj)(O - 8j -1). 
                  Pj 
Computing the first-order conditions yields 
               .. Pj-csj Pj-csj 
           Oi-Oi-1=
us -us• +us -? s• >0 for all j=2,...,J-1.                        ~+1 a ~ ~-1 
From the definition of 0j, we have 
                   Pi +1-P, Pj-Pa -1 
                 U s~ +1 -u s~ > u s~ -u s~-1 for all j = 2,...,J-1, (7) 
given the choice of each s, . 
     Suppose u is increasing and linear in s instead of concave. Then, since each side of 
(7) represents the. slope of P(s), and since it becomes steeper as sj gets larger, it is evident 
that P(s) is convex. This is also true in case that u(s) is increasing and convex, i.e., 
increasing marginal utility in consumption of space. That is, the quality/quantity 
premiums take place in the oligopolistic differentiated product market, which does agree 
with the findings in the real property markets. Hence, we may conclude that the quantity 
premiums in the real property markets are attributed to the oligopolistic competition 
between developers selling lots and apartments which are vertically differentiated under the 
nondecreasing marginal utility in space consumption, and attributed to the irreversibility 
in assembling lots. 
6. Concluding remarks 
     According to the theory of nonlinear pricing (Maskin and Riley, 1984), quantity 
discounts are shown to be optimal in a monopolized market. We tested the theory by 
using land market data in residential districts of Osaka Metropolitan Area in 1993. It was 
revealed that not the quantity discounts, but the quantity premiums are prevailing in the 
land market. We concluded that this is due to the irreversibility in changing lot size: once 
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it is subdivided and sold to different people, it is prohibitively difficult to repurchase and 
assemble them as it was before because of existence of the transaction costs. Theoretically, 
the quantity premiums can be explained by the setting of a oligopolistic market with 
vertically differentiated products (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992) under 
nondecreasing marginal utility and/or nondecreasing returns to scale in production. 
     Returning to the original question raised in the beginning, we now got an answer to 
it partly. The result of quantity premiums means higher land values per unit for larger lot 
size. And so, developers and landowners tend to maximize their lot sizes by assembling 
contiguous lots if possible, and by sacrificing open space such as roads and parks if allowed. 
In case that the social benefits and costs are fully capitalized by land prices, such activities 
in a free market economy may be justified. However, being characterized asa (local) 
public good, the open space is likely to be underprovided ue to free riders, which is one 
reason for the necessity of city planning by a public authority. 
     Another reason for city planning comes from the nature of irreversibility in changing 
lot size. Without any regulations like large lot zoning, some landowners may sell a lot by 
the piece just for personal convenience. As time goes on, lots are subdivided by piecemeal, 
which decreases the overall and price of the district, and prevents from efficient land use 
especially in the CBD where high rise building is highly demanded.
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Footnotes 
1 We settled on Table 2 after trying several functional forms and various kinds of 
explanatory variables such as area classification of zoning regulations, ratio of frontage to 
depth, width of a front road, levels of infrastructure, and so on. 
2 This finding is also supported by Edmonds (1985) and Suzaki (1991) although their 
data and the forms of equation (1) are somewhat different. 
3 Scotchmer (1985) argues that the lot size is endogenously determined by the 
distance and so on in the context of hedonic theory. 
4 While s expresses the level of quantity here
, it can be considered as the level of 
quality throughout the paper. 
5 Such a bunching' of consumers may be justified by Champsaur and Rochet (1990), 
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B2 for log p 0.650 0.849 0.866 0.812
Ba for p 0.627 0.817 0.728 0.704
Number of 
oservations










statistics are in parentheses.
Table 2 Regression analysis of equation (4)
